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How much we like something, whether it be a bottle of wine or a new film, is affected by the opinions of others. However, the social
information that we receive can be contradictory and vary in its reliability. Here, we testedwhether the brain incorporates these statistics
when judging value and confidence. Participants provided value judgments about consumer goods in the presence of online reviews.We
found that participants updated their initial value and confidence judgments in a Bayesian fashion, taking into account both the uncer-
tainty of their initial beliefs and the reliability of the social information. Activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of
belief update. Analogous to how lower-level perceptual information is integrated, we found that the human brain integrates social
information according to its reliability when judging value and confidence.
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Introduction
We may not like to admit it, but our own opinions are greatly
influenced by those of other people. When we book a holiday,
buy a new electronic device, or choose a film to watch, we often
rely on the opinions of other people expressed in the forms of
reviews. Taking other people’s judgments into account can be a
sensible strategy for a social species. Humans have similar needs
and therefore often share preferences with others in their so-
ciodemographic group. The effect of social influence on judg-
ments (i.e., social conformity) has been a topic of intense
investigation (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004) and, in more recent
years, the field of cognitive neuroscience has begun to dissect the
circuitry underpinning social conformity (Behrens et al., 2009;
Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Klucharev et
al., 2011; De Martino et al., 2013b; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013).
However, the social information that we receive, much like our
own beliefs, varies in its reliability or uncertainty. For example,
should one purchase headphones on Amazon’s website with a
4-star average based on hundreds of reviews or a competing
product with a 5-star average based on only a few people’s opin-
ions? In such circumstances, people should be sensitive to the
opinions of others but also to their prevalence.
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether the
human brain integrates social information according to its reli-
ability and how this in turn affects valuation and confidence
judgments. More specifically, we evaluated whether people inte-
grate their initial beliefs and those of others in a Bayesian fashion
such that the combination is weighted by the uncertainty of each
source of information. For example, according to the Bayesian
view, in the example above, people should update their beliefs
most toward the social consensus when they are initially uncer-
tain about the value of the headphones and there are a large
number of Amazon reviewers.
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Significance Statement
The field of perceptual decisionmaking has shown that the sensory system integrates different sources of information according
to their respective reliability, as predicted by a Bayesian inference scheme. In this work, we hypothesized that a similar coding
scheme is implemented by the human brain to process social signals and guide complex, value-based decisions. We provide
experimental evidence that the humanprefrontal cortex’s activity is consistentwith a Bayesian computation that integrates social
information that differs in reliability and that this integration affects the neural representation of value and confidence.
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Bayesian inference is a normative framework for how prior
beliefs are updated in light of new information (Vilares and
Kording, 2011; O’Reilly et al., 2012). One empirical signature of
Bayesian integration is that the relative uncertainties of an indi-
vidual’s prior beliefs and some external source of information
should govern how the information is combined. The Bayesian
approach has been successful in providing a compact description
of how beliefs are updated during perceptual decision making,
multisensory integration (Angelaki et al., 2009), and motor con-
trol (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2004; Knill
and Pouget, 2004; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008), as well as
higher-level cognitive abilities such as memory, language, and
inductive reasoning (Chater et al., 2006). However, it is still un-
known whether prior beliefs and social information are inte-
grated in a Bayesian fashion that weighs the information sources
by their uncertainty. How this process would be implemented in
the brain is also an open question.
In this study, we tested whether people integrate social infor-
mation with their prior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion and exam-
ined how the integration process is implemented in the brain.
The main focus of our neural analysis is the medial prefrontal
cortex; more specifically, the ventromedial (mPFC/vmPFC) and
dorsomedial medial (dACC/dmPFC) subregions. The mPFC/
vmPFC has a well established role in representing value estimates
(Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Clithero and Rangel, 2014) and, more
recently, it has been proposed that the same region tracks the
reliability in these estimates (Rolls et al., 2010; De Martino et al.,
2013a; Donoso et al., 2014; Barron et al., 2015; Lebreton et al.,
2015). The dACC/dmPFC was chosen because of its central role
in social cognition (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith,
2006; Lee, 2013; Ruff and Fehr, 2014;Wittmann et al., 2016) and,
more specifically, in mediating social influence over value com-
putation (Hampton et al., 2008; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010; Nicolle et al., 2012; De Martino et al., 2013b; Suzuki et al.,
2015).However, it is unclear how social information is integrated
into value computation in PFC. Does the signal in dmPFC detect
a conflict between the group consensus triggering a compromise
to the group evaluation? Or is it involved in a more complex
Bayesian updating that takes into account variable levels of reli-
ability in the social information as well as the level of confidence
in the prior belief?
Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-two participants 18–35 years of age [mean (SD)
24.82 (4.10), 11 female] were recruited from the University College Lon-
don (UCL) psychology subject pool. One participant was excluded be-
cause of a scanner technical problem. Another participant was excluded
because of excessive headmotion (3° rotation on 4 occasions). Another
2 participants were excluded because of erratic product ratings (3
skewness). A total of 18 participants were therefore included in the final
analysis. The study was approved by the UCL Psychology Ethics Com-
mittee.Written informed consent was obtained from all participants and
they were paid for participation.
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of 210 pictures of products from the retail
website Amazon (https://www.amazon.co.uk/) along with the product
name. Each picture was presented once in each task (prescanning task
and scanning task, see below) to participants in a randomized order. Four
to five bullet points with descriptions of each product were provided in
the prescanning task. These descriptions were based on the information
available for the products on the Amazon website. During the task in the
scanner, they were also presented with summary reviews of the products.
This information was presented exactly as it is shown on the Amazon
website: themeanof the reviews (1–5 stars), the number of reviewers, and
a 5-bar histogram showing the distribution of ratings across reviewers
(see Fig. 1A, right).
Prescanning task. Participants were required to make a series of prod-
uct ratings for 210 Amazon products. Participants were required to give
their liking rating for each item (see Fig. 1A, left) and their confidence in
their liking rating. A fixation cross was presented for 500ms. Participants
thenmoved the slider located at the bottomof the screen to indicate their
rating of the product. The location of the picture of the product and the
respective bullet point descriptions were left–right counterbalanced
across trials. The starting position of the slider was randomized on each
trial. After deciding on the product rating, the slider confirmed the se-
lection by changing to the color red for 500 ms. Once they provided the
product rating, participants were asked to indicate their confidence in
their decision on a continuous sliding scalewith six ticks but nonumbers,
with text going from “lower” to “higher” confidence. After deciding on a
confidence rating, the slider confirmed the selection by changing to the
color red for 1000 ms. There was no time limit for participants to rate a
product or indicate their confidence rating. The 210 trials in which they
did product and confidence ratings were divided into three blocks of 50
trials and one final block of 60 trials. The direction of the product rating
scale and the confidence scale were reversed after two blocks of trials. If a
participant started the experiment with a left to right presentation of the
scales (1–5 stars and “lower” to “higher” confidence, respectively), then,
after 2 blocks of trials (100 trials), participants would see the scales in
right to left presentation (5–1 stars and “higher” to “lower” confidence,
respectively). This was necessary to avoid visual and motor confounds
during imaging in the scanning task, which is why it was preferable for
participants to get accustomed to this procedure during the prescanning
task. The direction of the scale for the first two blocks of trials was chosen
randomly across participants. The prescanning session was conducted
the same day of the scanning task.
Scanning task.The scanning task presented the same 210 products that
participants rated in the prescanning task. In this task, participants did
not see the product descriptions. Instead, they were presented with in-
formation on other people’s ratings retrieved from Amazon. In particu-
lar, the scanning task showed the number of people that rated the
product, the mean rating of the product (on a scale from 1–5 stars), and
the distribution of ratings. An example screen shot is provided in Figure
1A (right). Participants did not see their own rating from the prescanning
task and were free to change their ratings in the light of other people’s
ratings. Participants were incentivized in this task because they were told
that a product would be selected at random at the end of the experiment
and would be given to them at a later date as part of their compensation.
They were told that, the higher their rating for a product, the better the
chances they would have in receiving that product. Products had a sim-
ilar retail price range.
As in the prescanning task, a fixation cross was presented, participants
decided on a product rating, and then the slider turned red for 500 ms
before moving on to the confidence rating. The duration of the initial
fixation cross was jittered. Unlike the prescanning task, participants were
only allowed 7 s to rate a product and 4 s to report their confidence.
Therefore, the timeline of the fMRI task was as follows: fixation cross
(jittered between 500 and 1500 ms), item presentation  liking rating
scale (7000 ms), and confidence rating (4000 ms).
Postscanning choice task. At the end of the functional scans and during
the structural scan, participantsmade 49 forced choices between a pair of
products that were both rated previously during the preceding scanning
task. Each pair contained one product with a low rating (randomly sam-
pled from the bottom tercile) and one with high rating (randomly sam-
pled from the top tercile). Participants selected the item from the top
tercile on 77.29% (SD 11.07) of the forced choices.
Image acquisition. Scanning acquisition was performed using a 1.5 T
Siemens TIM Avanto MRI Scanner with a 32-channel head coil used to
acquire both T1-weighted structural images and T2*-weighted echopla-
nar images (64 64; 3 3mmvoxels; echo time, 50ms; repetition time,
3132ms; flip angle, 90 degrees; field of view, 192mm)with blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. Each volume comprised 36 axial slices
(2 mm thick). We used a specific sequence that improved the signal-to-
noise ratio in the orbitofrontal cortex, a region that usually suffers from
signal dropoff (Deichmann et al., 2003). To further minimize this prob-
lem, we decided to acquire the imaging data in a 1.5 T MRI scanner,
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which has less-pronounced dropout in this region and therefore can
actually have greater BOLD sensitivity than higher-field-strength scan-
ners (Weiskopf et al., 2006). Functional scans were acquired in four
sessions, each comprising 228 volumes (10min). The first five volumes
in each sessionwere discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. At the
endof the fourth functional scan, a 5.5minT1-weightedMPRAGE struc-
tural scan was collected, which comprised 1-mm-thick axial slices paral-
lel to the AC–PC plane.
fMRI data analysis. Image preprocessing was performed using Statistical
Parametric Mapping 12 (SPM12, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimag-
ing, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Image analysiswas performedusing
SPM12. After discarding the first five dummy volumes, images were re-
aligned to the sixth volume and unwarped using seventh-degree B-spline
interpolation.Fieldmapswere reconstructed intoa singlephase file andused
to realign andunwarp Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI) functional images. Struc-
tural images were reregistered tomean EPI images and segmented into gray
and white matter. These segmentation parameters were then used to nor-
malize and bias correct the functional images. Normalization was to a stan-
dard EPI template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute reference
brainusing anonlinear (seventhdegreeB-spline) interpolation.Normalized
images were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at
half-maximum.
We ran two independent general linear models (GLMs). In GLM1,
onset regressors began at the presentation. Events were modeled by con-
volving a series of delta (stick) functions with the canonical HRF at the
beginning of each item presentation. These onsets were modulated by
two parametric regressors: a liking rating (R2) and postchoice confidence
ratings (C2), which ranged from 0–500 on an arbitrary scale. In GLM2,
onset regressors beginning at the presentation of the item were modu-
lated by one parametric regressor: Kullback–Leibler (KL) trial-by-trial
parameter estimate computed by fitting a descriptive Bayesian model to
the behavioral data. Both GLMs included six movement regressors. In
GLM2, two further subjects had to be excluded because theKLparameter
was zero in a number of instances: this resulted in the model not being
estimable in SPM. Note that the parametric regressors in both GLMs
were not orthogonalized and regressors were allowed to compete to al-
locate the shared variance (Mumford et al., 2015). Contrast images for
each regressor were tested for a significant deviation from 0 using one-
sample t tests. Activations were reported as significant if they survived
familywise error correction (FWE) for multiple comparisons across the
whole brain at the cluster level. Note that the cluster-forming threshold
was set as p 0.001 uncorrected to ensure an a well behaved family error
control (Eklund et al., 2016; Flandin and Friston, 2016). For dmPFC
isolated in the GLM2, we used small-volume correction using an 8 mm
sphere centered on the coordinates (3,51,24) taken from an indepen-
dent study (Hampton et al., 2008). The rfxplot toolbox (http://rfxplot.
sourceforge.net/) (Gla¨scher, 2009) was used to extract percentage signal
change at each region of interest defined by 8 mm spheres around and
used for the histogram plots. Note that the signals are not statistically
independent (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) and these plots are not used for
statistical inference (which was performed in the SPM framework); they
are shown solely for illustrative purposes (i.e., to clarify the signal pattern
in each cluster) and this has been stated explicitly in the figure legends.
Behavioral data analysis. Hierarchical regression analysis were performed
in R using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014). Participants’ product (R1
and R2) and confidence (C1 and C2) responses were normalized (z-
scored) separately for each participant for each of the four judgment
types to correct for any potential differences in scale usage.
Model. The model worked with the same z-scored data as used in the
behavioral analyses and was fit to individual participants. First, the prior
distribution (shown in blue in Fig. 4A) was formalized as a Gaussian
distribution. For each product j, the mean of this distribution for partic-
ipant iwas determined by the parameteri,j. For the prior variance, each
participant i had a variance parameter i
2 plus a nonpositive offset pa-
rameter i
	 that was included for higher confidence trials. Therefore, the
prior distribution for participant i for product j is as follows:
N
i, j,i
2  i
	I
C1i, jmedian
C1i
where I is an indicator function returning 1 when confidence was rated
above themedian and otherwise 0. According to the Bayesianmodel, higher
confidence should correspond to lower variance (i.e., greater precision). The
use of the median split simplifies the model and reduces the number of
assumptions needed to relate the model to the behavioral data.
The distribution of Amazon reviews for a product was also Gaussian
(shown in yellow in Fig. 4A). The mean was fixed to mj, the observed
mean of the amazon ratings for product j. Each participant i had a single
parameter, i
2, for the perceived variance (i.e., reliability) of the Amazon
reviews in general plus two parameters related to the number of Amazon
reviews. Therefore, the Amazon reviews for product j were parameter-
ized to contain vi  vi
	I
njmedian
n reviews, where nj was the number of
Amazon reviews as presented to participants during the experiment and
vi and vi
	 are non-negative parameters. As with confidence in the prior,
this median split of the parameters by the number of reviews mirrors the
behavioral analyses. A posterior distribution (shown in green in Fig. 4A)
was then derived using Bayes theorem, so the model did not have a
parameter specifically for a posterior distribution.
In summary, the model, which characterizes the degree to which par-
ticipants integrate information, accounts for 420 ratings (210 initial and
210 second ratings) from each participant with 210 parameters (i,j) for
prior means, two parameters (i
2, i
	) for prior variance, two parameters
(vi, vi
	) for the perceived number of Amazon reviews, and one parameter
(i
2) for the perceived variance in Amazon reviews. The parameter values
were estimated independently for each participant to maximize likeli-
hood of both initial and second ratings. Estimated prior mean and de-
rived posterior mean show strong positive correlations with initial and
second ratings: across 18 participants, correlation coefficients ranged
from 0.75 to 0.96 [mean: 0.90, 95% confidence interval (CI): 0.88–0.93]
between prior mean and an initial rating and from 0.85 to 0.96 (mean:
0.90, 95% CI: 0.89–0.92) between posterior mean and a second rating,
which indicates a good fit.
Because the model was not fit to the confidence ratings, one avenue to
evaluate the model is to compare the precision of its posterior to partic-
ipants’ second confidence ratings.Model precision should positively cor-
relate with confidence. Correlation coefficients ranged from 0.14 to 0.40
(mean: 0.18, 95% CI: 0.12–0.24, t(17)  5.95, p  0.001). The main
justification for the basic approach (i.e., integrating prior and likelihood
information according to their uncertainties) comes from the behavioral
results reported below.
Using the estimates from the model, the degree of resistance to Ama-
zon reviews is computed for each participant for each product as follows:
Prior precision
Prior precision Percived precision Amazon Rating
where prior precision is the inverse of prior variance and perceived pre-
cision of Amazon rating is estimated Amazon N divided by estimated
Amazon variance. Given Bayes theorem, the above specification captures
how heavily prior mean is weighted toward posterior mean.
Specifically, the degree of resistance to Amazon reviews is 1 when
Amazon rating is completely ignored and prior mean is the same as
posterior mean. In addition, the degree of resistance to Amazon reviews
to is 0 when prior is completely discarded and Amazonmean is the same
as posterior mean. A larger value indicates that Amazon mean is more
heavily weighted toward posterior mean than prior mean is.
This degree of resistance to Amazon reviews was mean averaged for
each participant across 210 product ratings.
Results
We developed a task in which participants were presented with a
series of products from the retail website Amazon (e.g., head-
phones, USB pens, mugs). Participants were required to give
their initial liking rating (R1) for each item and their confidence
(C1) in their liking rating (Fig. 1A). Bothmeasures were collected
before scanning. In the second part of the experiment, we re-
corded the participants’ neural activity (using fMRI) while they
were shown each item again, this time together with reviews from
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other customers who had bought those products (these were the
real reviews from the Amazon website). This information was
presented as it is shown on the Amazon website: the mean of the
reviews (1–5 stars), the number of reviewers, and a 5-bar histo-
gram showing the distribution of ratings across reviewers (Fig.
1A). At this second stage, we elicited another liking rating (R2),
again followed by a new confidence rating (C2).
To foreshadow the results, people followed the basic tenets of
Bayesian integration. A descriptive Bayesian model consistent
with these behavioral results made it possible to conduct a trial-
by-trial fMRI analysis to isolate brain regions that tracked the
degree to which social information and its reliability affected par-
ticipants’ beliefs.
Behavioral results
The central behavioral question was whether participants’ initial
product rating (R1) was combined with the Amazon groupmean
(M) in a Bayesian fashion to yield an updated product rating
(R2). The key property of Bayesian integration is weighting in-
formation by its reliability, which here corresponds to updating
more toward the group consensus when initial confidence is low
and the group is large. To evaluate whether people’s judgments
were consistent with Bayesian integration, we conducted a series
of hierarchal regression analyses to assess which sources of infor-
mation people considered when rating the products.
In particular, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis
to isolate the factors that contributed to the update from the first
to second product rating (i.e., R2  R1). The first analysis con-
siders whether people conform to the groupmean, which in itself
does not indicate Bayesian integration. We found that partici-
pants’ initial deviation from the group (i.e., M R1) was a reli-
able positive predictor of participants’ update
2
2  1000.79, p
0.001), meaning that participants systematically updated their
initial liking ratings in the direction of the group consensus (ex-
pressedhereby themeanreviews).More complex regressionmodels
included additional terms that evaluatedwhetherparticipants’ judg-
Figure 1. A, Task: In part 1 (before scanning), the participant is presentedwith a series of products from the retail website Amazon (e.g., headphones). The participant enters his/her liking rating
R1 followed by his/her confidence rating C1 in the liking rating (not shown the in figure schematic above). In the part 2 (inside of the scanner), the participant sees the same item again, this time
together with real reviews from the Amazon website: themean of the reviews (1–5 stars), the number of reviewers, and a 5-bar histogram showing the distribution of ratings across reviewers. At
this stage, theparticipant is required toenter anew likingR2andconfidence ratingC2. All effects predictedby theBayesianaccountare significant in theappropriatedirection. Shownare fixedeffects
coefficients from hierarchical linear regression models predicting rating update (R2 R1) (B1), confidence update (C2 C1) (B2), and second confidence rating (C2) (B3) for the following
predictors: initial deviation fromthegroup (MR1), interactionbetween the initial deviation fromthegroupandnumberof reviews (MR1 N ), interactionbetween the initial deviation from
the group and first confidence rating (M R1 C1), absolute difference in a participant’s initial product rating and the group consensus (R1M), quadratic function of product rating (R2 2).
Error bars indicate 95% CI. ***p 0.001. m.s., Median split.
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ments were consistent with aspects of Bayesian integration. In par-
ticular, interactions terms including confidence and the number of
reviews were also assessed using median splits. Median splits were
used because the psychological scaling of these quantities is unlikely
to be linear. These scaling issues, which are topics of investigation in
their own right (Siegler and Opfer, 2003; Kvam and Pleskac, 2016),
are beyond the scope of this contribution.
Consistent with Bayesian updating, the magnitude of move-
ment toward the group ratings was modulated by the level of
confidence in their first rating such that, when the initial confi-
dence was low, participants weremore strongly influenced by the
group consensus (negative interaction betweenM R1 and me-
dian split on initial confidence C1 
2
2  15.62, p 0.001). This
result is consistent with half of the Bayesian integration account,
namely that participants’ uncertainty in their own beliefs guides
their judgments. Evaluating the other half of the Bayesian ac-
count, the update toward the group consensus (mean of the Am-
azon’s reviews) was largest when that information was more
reliable because the number of reviews was higher (positive in-
teraction between M  R1 and median split of number of re-
views; 
2
2  24.33, p 0.001; Fig. 1B). Finally, we found that the
full regression model, which simultaneously takes into account
both sources of uncertainty, was superior to regressions that were
only sensitive to either confidence or number of reviews (
2
2 
17.55, p  0.001, and 
2
2  26.25, p  0.001), respectively. In
summary, the change in rating from R1 to R2was consistent with
Bayesian integration.
According to a Bayesian account of integration, confidence
should be highest in the second rating when the initial rating and
the group mean align. Indeed, the overall confidence decreased
(i.e., C2  C1) when the absolute difference in a participant’s
initial product rating and the group consensus (i.e., R1  M)
was high (
2
2  36.79, p  0.001) and confidence elicited after
the second rating (C2) was a quadratic function of product rating
(R22); that is, that confidencewas highest for products at the ends
of the rating scale (
2
2  547.92, p 0.001).
Together, these analyses established that participants inte-
grated their initial impression of a product and the group con-
sensus by taking into account the uncertainty associated with
each source of information (Fig. 1B).
fMRI results
We tested how the brain represents the value assigned to each item
and the confidence in that value.WeconstructedaGLM(GLM1), in
which each trial wasmodulated by two parametric regressors: liking
rating R2 and confidence C2 (in the liking rating) both collected
during the scanning (see Materials and Methods for more details).
Consistent with previous work (for meta-analyses, see Clithero and
Rangel, 2014), we show that activity in mPFC/vmPFC responded
linearly to increasing levels of subjective liking rate (p 0.05, FWE
corrected at cluster level; cluster-forming threshold p  0.001; see
Materials andMethods for more details; Fig. 2A). In the same anal-
ysis, we show thatmPFC also tracked subjective levels of confidence
(p 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level; cluster-forming threshold
p 0.001; Fig. 2B). To test whether liking rating and confidence in
the liking rating were encoded in the same brain region, we per-
formeda conjunction analysis between liking rating and confidence.
This analysis isolated a functional cluster in mPFC/vmPFC (peak
Figure 2. A, BOLD signal in mPFC/vmPFC correlates with monotonic increase in liking ratings (peak9,38,11 mm, z 4.21, p 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level). For illustration
purposes only, percentage signal change in vmPFC (8mmsphere centered at the peak of themain effect9,38,11) for 3 levels or rating level and confidence (low,medium, and high) are shown;
a linear relation between percentage signal changes and rating level and a nonsignificant (linear or quadratic) relation between percentage signal changes and confidence level.B, Activity inmPFC
(extending in vmPFC and dmPFC) trackedmonotonically the increases in confidence ratings (peak9,56,31, z 4.55, p 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level). For illustration purposes only,
percentage signal change inmPFC/dmPFC (8mmsphere centered at the peak of themain effect9, 56, 31) for 3 levels or rating and confidence (low,medium, andhigh) are shown; a linear relation
between percentage signal change and confidence levels and a significant quadratic relation between percentage signal change and rating levels. The histogram plots are not used for statistical
inference (which was performed in the SPM framework); they are shown solely to illustrate the dynamic of the BOLD signal. Error bars indicate SEM. SPM maps are thresholded at p 0.005
uncorrected for display purposes. C, Conjunction analysis for rating and confidence: activity inmPFC/vmPFC (peak activation at12,59,4, z 3.61, p 0.05, small volume corrected at peak level
using at 8 mm centered at2,52,2 from Lebreton et al., 2015).
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activation at12, 59, 4, z 3.61, p 0.05, small volume corrected
at peak level using at 8 mm centered at2,52,2 from Lebreton et
al., 2015; Fig. 2C). This result is consistent with the recent finding
that response in the same cluster inmPFC/vmPFC represents both a
linear response to pleasantness rating and aquadratic explanationof
pleasantness rating that, in that study, was used as a proxy for confi-
dence. (Lebreton et al., 2015).
We then tested whether there existed amPFC gradient coding
for confidence and value along the ventral–dorsal axis. We fitted
a hierarchical linear regressionmodel to contrast confidence ver-
sus rating (C2 R2) extracted from 7 different locations (signal
extracted by 8mmsphere for each location) along themPFC (Fig.
3A). These locations were selected solely on an anatomical basis
as opposed to by peak activity from any preceding analysis.
Across the group, we found a significant gradient along the rat-
ing/confidence axis (slope 0.02, t(20.95) 9.17, p 0.0001). To
confirm that the gradient was driven by both rating and confi-
dence, we performed two more regression analyses, which re-
vealed a negative ventromedial gradient in BOLD activity in
response to rating (slope  0.01, t(27.06)  4.74, p  0.0001)
and a positive ventromedial gradient in BOLD activity in re-
sponse to confidence (slope 0.01, t(17.80) 7.05, p 0.0001).
To quantify how social information shapes the value repre-
sentation in PFC, we developed a Bayesian model (a model sche-
matic overview of the Bayesian model is shown in Fig. 4A; see
Materials andMethods for full detail). TheBayesianmodel aimed
to explain the value update with three steps: (1) an initial rating is
drawn from a prior distribution, (2) this prior distribution is
updated in the light of Amazon reviews to form a posterior dis-
tribution, and (3) a second rating is drawn from the posterior
distribution.
The Bayesian model allowed us to calculate how social infor-
mation influenced participants’ initial impressions of value. In
the Bayesian framework, the KL divergence can quantify the ex-
tent to which a prior distribution is updated to form a posterior
distribution (Fig. 4A). Therefore, a larger KL divergence indicates
a greater preference update. KL divergence is critical in the fMRI
analyses because it provides a combined measure of trial-by-trial
update that takes into account both the uncertainty reflected by
the participant’s confidence rating and the number of reviews
(i.e., group size). Letting p and q denote prior and posterior den-
sity function, respectively, KL divergence is computed as follows:
 p
 xlog q
xdxp
xlog p
xdx
In our Bayesian model, both prior and posterior distributions
were Gaussian distributions. Therefore, the above equation re-
duces to the following:
log
post
prior

prior
2  
prior post
2
2post
2 
1
2
whereprior andpost are the prior and posteriormeans andprior
2
and post
2 are the prior and posterior variances.
The Bayesian model enables a key analysis, namely the iden-
tification of brain areas that track the magnitude of Bayesian
value update in the presence of social information. A new GLM
(GLM2) was constructed using a parametric regressor that
tracked the trial-by-trial KL divergence estimates using the afore-
mentioned model fits. KL divergence takes into account all as-
pects of belief change such as the initial rating and confidence and
the mean and number of Amazon reviews. This analysis found a
trial-by-trial response in dmPFC (Fig. 4B) to parametric in-
creases in KL divergence (p 0.05 small volume corrected cen-
tered on a priori hypothesized coordinates 3,51,24 from
Hampton et al., 2008). In other words, activity in this cluster
indexes the size of update of a value judgment after the social
information provided by the Amazon review has been presented.
We then tested whether this same region indexed how likely
participants were to conform to the social consensus in general.
We constructed a between-subjects measure of how resistant
subjects were to the social information carried by the reviews.
Specifically, the degree of resistance to Amazon reviews is 1 when
Amazon rating is completely ignored and prior mean is the same
as posterior mean. In addition, the degree of resistance to Ama-
zon reviews is 0 when prior is completely discarded and Amazon
mean is the same as posterior mean. A larger value indicates that
Amazon mean is more heavily weighted toward posterior mean
than prior mean (see Materials and Methods for more details).
We then extracted the BOLD signal in this region of interest (8
mm sphere centered at the peak of the effect isolated from the
independent within-subject analysis GLM2) and tested whether
the activity in this region showed a positive modulation by the
Figure 3. Spatial gradient analysis along the ventral– dorsal axis of mPFC (see colored dots) for a contrast between the parametric response to rating and the parametric response to confidence
(R2 C2). Data from seven anatomical locations (A) are mapped onto a line and the spatial regression slope is computed (B). Across participants, there is a robust gradient along the medial lane
of PFC with response to rating expressed in the more ventral part and response to confidence represented in in the more dorsal part.
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individual ability to resist to the social information (carried by
the reviews showed by Amazon website) while constructing their
value judgments. This analysis showed that activity in this cluster
of dmPFC (Fig. 4B) was higher for those individuals who were
less influenced by the information carried by the reviews of other
people (r 0.77, p 0.0005). This between-subject analysis and
the preceding trial-by-trial within-subject analysis provide com-
plementary viewpoints on dmPFC’s role in belief updating.
Discussion
In this study, we show that the degree to which value and confi-
dence judgments are influenced by the opinions of others (ex-
pressed through online reviews) is modulated by both the
reliability of the group’s opinions and the individual’s confidence
in their own prior belief. We found that people’s updated judg-
ments were consistent with a Bayesian integration account that
updated more toward the group consensus when initial confi-
dencewas low and the groupwas large. Themodel was verified by
eliciting liking and confidence judgments twice, the first time
when each item was presented in isolation and a second time
when it was presented together with the reviews collected from
the Amazon website. At the behavioral level, we found that the
number of reviews significantly modulated the shift toward the
group consensus (i.e., toward themean of theAmazon’s reviews).
This shift was more substantial when the participants were less
sure in their initial ratings (low level of confidence) and a large
shift toward the group consensus was characterized by a drop in
the overall level of confidence. These results showed that uncer-
tainty in both the social information and participants’ initial es-
timates (gauged through confidence reports) modulated the
participants’ behavioral responses.
To help quantify the impact of the social information on the
computation of value and confidence, we constructed a simple
Bayesian model that captured the main aspects of the behavioral
results. Although not fitted to the confidence data, the model cor-
rectly predicted confidence as evidenced by a positive correlation
between the precision of its posterior distributions with confidence
collected during the scanning phase. This finding is consistent with
the idea that verbal reports of confidence closely match the formal
concept of precision as defined in Bayesian probability (Meyniel et
al., 2015a, 2015b; but see Pouget et al., 2016).
Analysis of the fMRI data showed that mPFC/vmPFC tracked
both the subjective rating and the confidence level in that esti-
mate. Our work adds to recent studies that have considered the
role that these areas play in representing confidence during value-
based choice. For example, DeMartino et al. (2013a) have shown
that activity in vmPFC correlates with both difference in value
and confidence in a binary choice task. Our study provides a
strong test of this characterization of the vmPFC because partic-
ipants judged objects in isolation rather than in a binary choice
task, which resulted in rating and confidence sharing a quadratic
as opposed to linear relationship (i.e., confidence is highest for
extreme ratings). Nevertheless, we found that vmPFC tracked
both the participants’ confidence and liking ratings. These find-
ings are consistent with a recent study by Lebreton et al. (2015)
Figure4. A, Schematic representation of the Bayesian update of liking ratings in response to social information communicated through reviews. The KL divergence parameter indexes the impact
of the reviews in shifting the liking rate from the first rating (made in the absence of review information) and the second rating (performed by the participants after seeing the Amazon reviews).
B, BOLD signal in dmPFC (peak6,50,40) correlates with increase in KL divergence (z 3.66, p 0.05, FWE small volume corrected). Percentage signal change for three levels (low,medium,
and high) of KL divergence is shown. The histogram plot is not used for statistical inference (which was performed in the SPM framework); it is shown solely to illustrate the dynamic of the BOLD
signal. Error bars indicate SEM.C, Between-subject correlationbetweenactivity indmPFC (8mmROI centeredat6,50,40) and thedegreeof resistance to social information (r0.77,p0.0005).
This analysis shows that people who are less influenced by the opinion expressed by others in the reviews have overall more activity in this area.
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finding that activity in mPFC/vmPFC correlates with both the
linear and quadratic expansion of the pleasantness ratings that
might reflect an automatic assessment of confidence.
We helped to resolve the relationship between confidence and
value representations in the PFC by finding a smooth gradient
along the medial ventral–dorsal axis of PFC with liking ratings
manifested more ventrally and confidence ratings more dorsally.
A possible interpretation of this result is that there are two pop-
ulations of neurons distributed along the ventral–dorsal axis of
mPFC, with the more ventral region coding for the mean value
estimate and the more dorsal region coding for the reliability of
these estimates (eithermeasured directly by confidence ratings or
indirectly through the quadratic expansion of liking rating). A
similar gradient has been found for values that are executed (rep-
resented more ventrally) and values that are modeled but not
executed (represented more dorsally; Nicolle et al., 2012). An
intriguing possibility is the more dorsal part of the PFC is impli-
cated in a high-order belief inference (Yoshida and Ishii, 2006)
for monitoring the reliability of the behavioral strategy in which
the agent is currently engaged (Donoso et al., 2014), as in value
estimation in our study. Such inferences may tap similar pro-
cesses with those used to reason about other people’s states,
which is also hypothesized to involve the more dorsal regions of
PFC (Denny et al., 2012).
Ourmodeling approach quantified the degree of value update
resulting from exposure to the social information carried by the
reviews on a trial-by-trial basis. In our model, the KL divergence
indexes the shift from the before posterior belief when new evi-
dence (i.e., likelihood) is available. Our model-based fMRI anal-
ysis showed that activity in dmPFC positively correlated with KL
divergence. We found that the dmPFC responded at the trial-by-
trial level to the size of update in value judgment from the prior
judgments (made in absence of social information) to posterior
judgments after the participants were exposed to other people’s
opinions (expressed at the aggregate level by the reviews). Recent
work using a perceptual decision-making task also found that
activity in dmPFC (though slightly more posterior to the peak of
ourmain activation) covaried with belief updating in response to
new information (O’Reilly et al., 2013).
Earlier work implicates the dmPFC in theory of mind and in
social cognition more generally (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Beh-
rens et al., 2009) through enabling agents to take into account the
judgments of others during value-based choice (Behrens et al.,
2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2009; Coricelli and
Nagel, 2009; De Martino et al., 2013b; Suzuki et al., 2015). Al-
though these studies focused on the dmPFC, related studies have
found a role for other brain regions in the social modulation of
learning and hedonic experience. For example, the rostral cingu-
late cortex and striatum have been found to track the mismatch
between the opinions of an individual and a group (Klucharev et
al., 2009). This basicmismatch is analogous to deviating from the
group in our study absent weighting by the reliability of the indi-
vidual and group information sources. A second fMRI study in-
vestigated how teenagers were influenced by popularity ratings in
judging song tracks (Berns et al., 2010). Their analyses (using a
masking procedure) focused on a network of regions (including
insula) that were activated during hedonic experience (i.e., listen-
ing to the song track), which can be contrasted with the more
abstract evaluation processes invoked by our task.
From a computational perspective, internal models should be
updated when new information (or a change in the task) makes
the current model inadequate (Durstewitz et al., 2010; Dome-
nech and Koechlin, 2015). This shift usually pushes the agent
toward more explorative behaviors (Daw et al., 2006; Hayden et
al., 2011; Karlsson et al., 2012; O’Reilly et al., 2013). Other studies
have shown that activity in dmPFC tends to increase in those
situations in which an agent has to abandon the current model
(because it has become unreliable) and initiate exploration
(Karlsson et al., 2012;O’Reilly et al., 2013; Tervo et al., 2014).One
possibility is that the update is triggered by noradrenaline (Yu
and Dayan, 2005) that signals a mismatch between the predic-
tions of the current internalmodel and external feedback (Yu and
Dayan, 2005; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; McGuire et al.,
2014). A recent study has provided experimental support for this
idea by showing that noradrenaline mediates this switch by
changing the noradrenergic inputs to the ACC (Tervo et al.,
2014).
Our results suggest that dmPFC involves a higher-order infer-
ence similar to that required when estimating the reliability in
one’s own appraisals of value (see also Nicolle et al., 2012). It is
possible that, in most social interactions, humans are required to
represent others’ preferences (an ability linked to theory ofmind)
and that this information is used to update their own preferences.
An intriguing possibility is that the basic computation of dmPFC
is to represent and manipulate multiple beliefs, explaining its
prominent role in theory of mind.
Finally, although, at the within-participants level, dmPFC ac-
tivity and KL divergence positively correlated, at the between-
participants level, we found that activity in dmPFC in response to
KL divergence was more pronounced for people less amendable
to conforming to the group consensus (i.e., adjusting their rat-
ings toward the group’s ratings). This result is consistent with
dmPFC playing a role in monitoring differences between an in-
dividual’s opinion and that of the group. Greater dmPFC in-
volvement overall appears to indicate heightened sensitivity to
divergence with the group, which may facilitate an individual
maintaining their original opinion to a greater extent. In contrast,
a personwho readily conforms to the group consensus would not
integrate personal beliefs with the group’s as much as wholesale
accept the group’s opinion. In such a case, the dmPFC should not
be very active overall, assuming its role is to monitor differences
between belief representations. In reality, people should fall along
a continuum of conformity such that dmPFC activity tracks both
trial-by-trial updates and the overall propensity to conform.
These findings are also consistent with two recent TMS studies
finding that that stimulating posterior medial frontal cortex
modulates social conformity (Klucharev et al., 2011) and choice-
induced preference changes (Izuma et al., 2015).
In conclusion, our work suggests that the update of value and
confidence in response to social information involves an integration
mechanism analogous to that used in perceptual decision making.
Belief update followsBayesianprinciples inwhich clear signatures of
value, confidence, and belief update are reflected in PFC activity.
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